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Abstract 
Conventional wisdom as well as economic theory suggests it is more costly to reassemble fragmented 
land due to transactions costs and strategic bargaining costs. Both costs are expected to increase with the 
number of sellers.  Inefficient allocation of land resources may result including property entropy (Parisi 
2002), urban sprawl (Miceli and  Sirmans 2007) and deteriorating inner cities. Given the difficulty of 
observing actual values attached by buyers and sellers to land, little empirical evidence exists to support 
the conventional wisdom and theoretical work. We use experimental methods to examine transactions 
costs and strategic bargaining costs in a land-assembly market game with one buyer, one to four sellers, 
and complementary exchanges.  The buyer’s final earnings vary inversely with the number of sellers, 
ceteris paribus, indicating an incentive to purchase consolidated land. Delay costs reduce holdout, but 
result in lower payoffs for both buyers and sellers. Competition between sellers reduces holdout and the 
buyer’s total purchase price. 
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1.  Introduction 
Land-assembly problems arise when multiple adjacent parcels must be acquired by a developer to 
complete an indivisible project. The potential exists for individual landholders to refuse to negotiate 
initially, or to strategically delay agreement, in an attempt to capture a greater share of the total surplus 
created by an exchange. Because of potential inefficiencies from delay costs and failed land exchanges, 
land assembly and the “holdout problem” have received considerable attention (e.g. Munch 1976; Eckart 
1985; O’Flaherty 1994; Strange 1995; Menezes and Pitchford 2004a and 2004b; Miceli and Segerson 
2007). Conventional wisdom and the theoretical work on the holdout problem suggest it is more costly to 
reassemble fragmented land due to transactions costs and strategic bargaining costs. Furthermore, both 
costs are expected to increase with the number of sellers.  Inefficient allocation of land resources may 
result including property entropy (Parisi 2002), urban sprawl (Miceli and  Sirmans 2007) and 
deteriorating inner cities.  The holdout problem has been cited as a potential justification for eminent 
domain
1 (Miceli and Sirmans 2007; Nosal 2007). Holdout problems may exist in other contexts as well, 
including wage negotiations (Houba and Bolt 2000; van Ours 1999; Gu and Kuhn 1998; Cramton and 
Tracy 1992), debt restructuring (Miller and Thomas 2006; Hege 2003; Datta and Iskandar-Datta 1995; 
Brown 1989), and corporate takeovers (Cohen 1991). 
Because of the inherent difficulty in observing landowners’ reservation prices and the value a 
developer places on a development project, studies of land assembly and the holdout problem have been 
almost exclusively theoretical in nature. Our research provides empirical insight into the holdout problem 
through a laboratory bargaining experiment modeled after a land-assembly game. Three other empirical 
approaches are presented in Munch (1976), Tanaka (2007), and Cadigan, et al (2009). Munch (1976) 
investigates prices paid for urban renewal properties in Chicago during the 1960’s and concludes that the 
prices paid for properties under eminent domain do not appear to be consistent with the pattern of 
expected landowners’ reservation prices. Specifically, low-valued properties systematically receive less 
                                                           
1 Eminent domain refers to the legal power of the state to expropriate property without the owner’s consent. Eminent 
domain may also be called compulsory purchase, compulsory acquisition, or expropriation.  
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than market value, while high-valued properties receive more. Importantly, while conventional wisdom 
suggests an incentive for sellers to holdout in order to increase the value of their land to a developer, she 
identifies a potential incentive for buyers, given the prospect of acquisition through eminent domain, to 
holdout in order to depress the market values of some properties to be acquired. Because of the likely 
correlation between property size and property value, it is important to further investigate how property 
sizes and the number of sellers impact bargaining behavior and efficiency in a land-assembly game. 
Tanaka (2007) uses laboratory experiments to compare the efficiency of alternative market 
institutions for consolidating fragmented land. Importantly, in contrast to subjects in our experiment, all 
subjects in the Tanaka experiments are initially landowners and may subsequently be buyers or sellers of 
land. Although focused on comparing the efficiency of alternative market mechanisms and not holdout or 
bargaining behavior per se, Tanaka reports strategic holdout behavior in one of his treatments, a two-sided 
combinatorial market with a small number of subjects and commodities. 
Cadigan, et al (2009) examine the holdout problem through six experimental bargaining 
treatments that vary the bargaining institution (whether buyers or sellers make the offers), the number of 
bargaining periods, and the costs associated with delay. The results demonstrate that holdout is common 
across treatments and is, on average, a payoff-improving strategy for responders. Delay costs led to more 
generous buyer offers and seller demands, and less overall holdout. The availability of more bargaining 
periods led to more aggressive initial bargaining stances by buyers and sellers (that is, lower offers by 
buyers and higher demands by sellers), both with and without delay costs. Importantly, they found that 
nearly all exchanges eventually occurred in the repeated-offer treatments, leading to a relatively high 
level of overall efficiency, both with and without delay costs. All of the treatments in Cadigan, et al 
(2009), however, involved just two sellers. 
In this paper we extend the experimental analysis by examining the extent to which holdout 
behavior and efficiency, as well as the distribution of the surplus, are affected by changes in the number 
of sellers. If an increase in the number of sellers, ceteris paribus, decreases the buyer’s payoff because of  
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transactions costs and strategic bargaining costs, then potential developers may have an incentive ex ante 
to seek consolidated land for development even if the total economic surplus from such projects is smaller 
than that of a projects assembling more fragmented land. This bias for consolidated land may lead to 
inefficient land allocation and associated costs from urban sprawl, as land tends to be more fragmented 
near city centers (Henderson 1985). 
To this end we examine bargaining treatments with one to four sellers. We maintain the same 
institutional framework as Cadigan, et al (2009) by using a repeated-offer bargaining game, where the 
buyer makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to buy in half of the treatments, and the sellers make take-it-or-
leave-it demands to sell in the others. Of the ten total treatments, four have costless delay and six have 
costly delay. 
It is important to empirically investigate the impact of competition and the number of sellers on 
holdout, efficiency, and the distribution of the economic surplus. Most land-assembly models associate 
holdout and delay with efficiency losses because players are assumed to discount future payoffs. Both 
Strange (1995) and Eckart (1985) find in their models that increasing the number of landowners (by 
reducing the size of individual landholdings) increases the total asking price of landowners, resulting in 
greater delay and efficiency loss. While this may be consistent with common perceptions of small 
landholders holding up large development projects, the impact has yet to be empirically demonstrated or 
quantified, and the potential justification for using eminent domain rests largely on the severity of the 
holdout problem. Competition between landowners, on the other hand, should result in lower landowner 
asking prices, therefore largely mitigating potential holdout problems. 
As in Cadigan, et al (2009), we find that holding out is a payoff-improving strategy, on average, 
in each of the treatments studied. However, the introduction of extraneous sellers in our competition 
treatments increases the speed at which agreements take place, thereby increasing efficiency. 
Qualitatively consistent with equilibrium predictions, the presence of extraneous sellers also serves to 
increase the bargaining payoff of buyers relative to sellers, particularly when sellers make take-it-or- 
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leave-it demands to the buyer. However, increasing the number of required consenting sellers, ceteris 
paribus, results in significantly greater delay, more failed agreements, and lower overall efficiency. The 
increase in the deadweight loss here appears to come primarily from the buyer’s share of the surplus. The 
bargaining institution (that is, which side is making the offers) has relatively little effect on either the 
distribution of the surplus or the efficiency of exchange. 
   In section 2 we describe the basic model that motivates the experimental design. Section 3 
describes the experimental treatments and provides equilibrium predictions. Experimental results are 
given in section 4. Section 5 presents an alternative behavioral model to explain the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Modeling Framework 
  Following Menezes and Pitchford (2004b) , Miceli and Segerson (2007), and Cadigan, et al 
(2009) consider a simple model in which a single risk-neutral agent (the “buyer”) wishes to purchase N 
complementary units of a good from N other independent, risk-neutral agents (the “sellers”). The units 
can be interpreted as intermediate inputs into the production of a large project. Each seller i has one unit 
for sale and incurs a cost ci for this unit. The value of the project to the buyer is V if N input units can be 








          ( 1 )  
indicating that there is an economic surplus generated by the project.  







i p V             ( 2 )  
where pi is the price paid for unit i, and each seller i receives a payoff  ) ( i i c p  . We assume that the 
buyer is able to write contingent contracts such that all parties receive a payoff of zero if any of the  
  7
required input units are not purchased. To examine holdout, we allow bargaining over several periods. 
Delay is costly such that payoffs are reduced by a factor   (where 0 ≤  ≤ 1) for each additional period, 
on average, needed for agreements to be reached. For example, payoffs would be reduced by   if all 
agreements were reached in the second period, reduced by 2  if agreements were reached in the third 






i c V  shrinks by   
from period to period.  Competition between sellers is introduced by allowing for the possibility that there 
are  M N   total sellers, where  0  M . That is, there may be extraneous sellers to the larger exchange. 
 
3.   The Experiment 
As in Cadigan, et al (2009) we use one-sided repeated-offer bargaining rather than more complex 
multi-party Nash bargaining
2 or bargaining with alternating offers. Nash bargaining does not allow one 
party to holdout by explicitly rejecting an offer, which is of primary interest in the current project. It 
would also place greater importance on risk preferences and is difficult to implement experimentally 
because of the likelihood of off-equilibrium decisions. We also avoid bargaining with alternating offers 
for the present purposes because it introduces an additional incentive to reject an offer in order to become 
the proposer. To examine the importance of being the proposer, we compare separate treatments in which 
buyers make repeated take-it-or-leave-it offers to buy with those in which sellers make repeated take-it-
or-leave-it  demands to sell. In each treatment, responders decide only whether to accept or reject an offer 
or demand. 
3.1  Experimental treatments 
All treatments in our 5x2 design were conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). In all 
treatments, the buyer has a maximum of ten periods to acquire the necessary units from sellers, otherwise 
                                                           
2 Under Nash bargaining, all parties submit a demand for their share of the surplus. If the sum of the demands is less 
than or equal to the surplus, each party is paid their demand. If the sum of the demands exceeds the surplus, all 
parties receive zero. 
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all participants receive a payoff of zero. The One seller protocol involves bargaining between one buyer 
and one seller. The Two seller protocol involves bargaining between one buyer and two sellers, and the 
buyer must acquire one unit from each seller. Delay is costless ( 0   ) in both the One seller and Two 
seller protocols. Sellers’ costs in the two-seller protocol are half of the seller’s cost in the one-seller 
protocol, meaning the total economic surplus from exchange is kept constant. 
The Two seller delay cost protocol is identical to the two-seller protocol except that there is a 10% 
delay cost ( 10 . 0   ). The Competition protocol involves bargaining between one buyer and three 
sellers, and the buyer must acquire two of the three available units to receive a positive payoff. That is, 
one seller is extraneous. The Four seller protocol involves bargaining between one buyer and four sellers, 
and the buyer must acquire one unit from each seller. As in the Two seller delay cost protocol, the 
Competition and Four seller treatments each have a 10% delay cost ( 10 . 0   ). Again, relative to the 
Two seller delay cost protocol we double the number of sellers in the Four seller protocol, but reduce 
sellers’ costs by half. This maintains the same total sellers’ costs and the same total surplus from the 
exchange in all of the treatments in which the number of sellers alone changes. 
The ten total treatments are generated by conducting the (1) One seller, (2) Two seller, (3) Two 
seller delay cost, (4) Competition, and (5) Four seller protocols with buyers making offers in five 
treatments, and sellers making demands in the other five treatments. In each case, the party receiving the 
offer or demand chooses to accept or reject the offer. If a responder rejects an offer or demand, the 
proposer is able to make a new offer or demand (one per period) for up to a maximum of ten periods. 
Unlike in the Gneezy, et al (2003) experiments, proposers in our experiment are not constrained to 
increase their offers (or reduce their demands) upon a rejection. 
Valuations and costs are common knowledge. The buyer’s valuation is V =$ 90 in all treatments. 
The sellers’ costs are symmetric such that  60 $ 1  c  in the one-seller treatments,  30 $ 2 1   c c  in the 
two-seller treatments,   30 $ 3 2 1    c c c  in the Competition treatments, and  
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15 $ 4 3 2 1     c c c c in the four-seller treatments. This results in an economic surplus of $30 that 
may be divided between the participants
3. Within each period, all offers or demands take place 
simultaneously. Once a seller accepts an offer from the buyer, or has a demand accepted by the buyer, 
that seller makes no additional decisions. In the costly delay treatments, holding out incurs a payoff-
reducing externality regardless of the decisions of the other subjects. Subjects are informed of their 
experimental earnings (adjusted for any delay costs) plus a $10 show-up fee and paid privately, in cash at 
the end of the experiment. 
3.2  Equilibrium predictions 
Assuming complete information and that each agent seeks to maximize his monetary self-interest, 
the well-known unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the single-period ultimatum game is for the 
proposer to offer the smallest share of the surplus possible, and for the responder to accept it. Let bi 
represent a buyer’s offer to buy and di represent a seller’s demand to sell a particular unit. In the One 
seller, Two seller, Two seller costly delay and Four seller treatments used here, this implies: 
Proposition 1: When the buyer makes offers to sellers, the buyer offers each seller her cost. That is, 
i i c b    i  .
4 
 
Proposition 2a: When N sellers make demands, multiple equilibria exist. The set of equilibria are 





 and  i c d i i   . 
Proposition 3: Responders should accept any offer or set of demands that leaves them with a non-
negative surplus. 
Proposition 1 is the standard equilibrium prediction for proposer behavior which implies here that 
the buyer captures all (or nearly all) of the surplus. Proposition 2a characterizes a Nash-like bargaining 
                                                           
3 Note that at least one participant in the competition treatments must necessarily have a payoff of zero. 
4 Technically, each seller is indifferent between accepting or rejecting. Therefore, accepting is a weakly dominate 
strategy and, therefore, constitutes a best-response. One could alternatively assume that     i i c b , where   is 
the smallest unit of account available. In this case each seller earns a small surplus by accepting. For simplicity, we 
assume that  0    in the limit and proceed without the more cumbersome notation.  
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outcome from the perspective of sellers. Proposition 3 follows from the assumption that a positive payoff 
is preferred to a zero payoff. 
However, in the Competition treatments, we must modify the second proposition to  
Proposition 2b: When N+M sellers make demands, sellers demand their cost. That is,  i c d i i   .
5 
 
Propositions 1 – 3 are unaffected by the addition of multiple periods and delay costs. Responders 
cannot increase their payoff by rejecting an offer or set of demands that leaves them with a non-negative 
surplus, because there is nothing in the standard game-theoretic predictions of proposers to indicate that 
they, in equilibrium, should offer a greater share of the surplus following a rejected offer or demand. That 
is, the equilibrium predictions given for a one-period game above are also subgame perfect for the ten-
period game.  
 The Competition and Four seller treatments were conducted at Michigan State University. The 
remaining treatments were conducted at Gettysburg College. Subjects for all treatments were 
undergraduate volunteers who participated anonymously via computer and were paid the show-up fee 
plus their experimental earnings privately, in cash, after each experimental session. One thousand and 
eighteen subjects participated for a total of between 27 and 33 bargaining groups per treatment. 
 
4.  Results 
Tables 1 and 2 present offer, demand, and earnings results from the ten treatments. Table 1 shows 
the results from both the buyer-offer and seller-demand treatments. The table gives the mean first period 
offer or demand, as well as the mean real final payoff for buyers and sellers. Real payoffs are adjusted for 
                                                           
5 Proposition 2b must be modified if sellers have heterogeneous costs. If sellers are homogenous, Bertrand 
competition drives equilibrium demands to costs, and the buyer accepts N randomly selected demands. If sellers are 
heterogeneous, normalize the ordering of sellers from lowest cost to highest cost. Sellers submit demands such that 
V c N N i c d N i V d c c d




i N i i
N i i N i
        









* if and 1 that such ) , (
* if and 1
 
The buyer accepts the N lowest demands. The uniqueness of the equilibrium depends on N relative to N+M and on 
the exact structure of costs.  
  
  11
any delay costs. For comparison, the table also gives the mean buyer and seller earnings that would have 
resulted had all first-period offers or demands been accepted. 
      [Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 provides rejection, holdout, and efficiency statistics. Holdout is calculated as the average 
period in which agreements were reached.
6 Efficiency is calculated as the actual total group earnings 
divided by the maximum possible (which is $30 per group, the value of the original surplus). 
    [Insert  Table  2  here] 
We discuss the earnings results and holdout and efficiency results separately. 
Buyer and seller earnings results 
The standard game-theoretic predictions indicate that the buyer should capture the entire surplus 
in the buyer-offer treatments (and all competition treatments), and none of the surplus in the seller-
demand, non-competition treatments. In principle, therefore, the buyer should be indifferent between 
bargaining with one seller or multiple sellers, ceteris paribus. However, conventional wisdom, as well as 
our experimental results, suggests something quite different.  
From Table 1, in the buyer-offer treatments, the buyer’s highest average final earnings occurred 
with one seller ($16.10). The buyer’s average final earnings fell significantly to $10.55 when a second 
seller was added, ceteris paribus.
7 Similarly, the buyer’s average earnings with two sellers and costly 
delay was $11.12, falling significantly to $7.24 with four sellers, ceteris paribus. The addition of a 
competing seller, however, raised the buyer’s average earnings from $11.12 to $13.65. These earnings 
differences are both meaningful in scale and statistically significant. 
Furthermore, these earnings changes could be predicted based on buyers’ first-period offers. 
Although the majority of first-period offers are rejected, the pattern of first-period offers is consistent with 
                                                           
6 For calculation purposes, agreement period is recorded as period 11 for any bargaining pair that failed to reach an 
agreement by period 10. 
7 Using a Mann-Whitney Test, all two-tailed significance levels were less than 0.10 for all of the comparisons across 
treatments discussed here. For brevity, we note only when differences are not statistically significant at the 10% 
level or below.  
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the pattern of final earnings. That is, buyers offered more to two sellers as a group ($8.56 jointly, on 
average) in the first period compared to one seller ($5.58). Buyers offered more to four sellers as a group 
($14.16) than to two sellers ($11.64 in the two-seller, costly delay treatment), ceteris paribus, but less to 
sellers as a group ($9.48) when there was competition. Thus, it is clear that buyers’ understood the likely 
impacts on their final earnings even in the very first period. 
The results were remarkably similar when the sellers made demands on the buyer. The buyers 
earned $14.08 on average with one seller, but only $10.43 with two sellers, ceteris paribus. With two 
sellers and costly delay buyers earned $9.39 on average, but only $5.30 with four sellers, ceteris paribus. 
Adding a competing seller increased buyers’ earnings, from $9.39 to $16.73. Indeed buyers earned 
significantly more on average when sellers made demands under competition ($16.73) than they did when 
buyers made offers under the same competitive conditions ($13.65). Again, all of these earnings 
differences are meaningful and statistically significant. 
As in the buyer-offer treatments, the final earnings results in the seller-demand treatments can 
also be seen in the pattern of first-period demands. The average first-period demand of the surplus with 
one seller was $22.53, while two-sellers jointly demanded even more than the available surplus in the first 
period ($33.46 on average). Similarly, with costly delay two sellers demanded an average of $28.34 of the 
surplus in the first period, while four sellers jointly demanded a whopping $43.64. However, sellers’ first-
period joint demand dropped to $16.58 on average when there was competition. Again, the pattern of 
first-period demands, though generally rejected at a very high rate, are consistent with and foreshadow the 
pattern of buyer earnings. 
Holdout and efficiency results 
  In analyzing the change in buyers’ earnings from treatment to treatment, it is important to 
distinguish changes that occur due to delay costs and failed agreements, from strategic changes in the 
offers and demands themselves (and thus, sellers’ earnings). Consider first the two buyer-offer treatments 
with no delay costs. Because there are no delay costs and no failed agreements, the change in buyers’  
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average final earnings (from $16.10 with one seller to $10.55 with two sellers) can only have arisen 
because buyers’ offered more to sellers as a group in the latter treatment. Interestingly, this appears to 
have occurred voluntarily as the average agreement period (our measure of holdout) was actually 
somewhat higher with one seller (period 7.39) compared to two sellers (period 6.40), though the 
difference in delay is not statistically significant.
8 
  Comparing the two-seller, buyer-offer treatment (with delay costs) to the four-seller treatment, 
the average agreement period was higher with four sellers (period 2.98 compared to 2.47)
9 and there were 
two failed agreements in the four-seller treatment and none in the two-seller treatment. Interestingly, as a 
group the sellers in the four-seller treatment who reached agreements with the buyer earned only about a 
dollar more ($15.40) on average compared to the two-seller groups ($14.48), while the buyer earned 
nearly $4 less than on average. Thus, we can conclude that the decrease in the buyer’s average earnings 
between these treatments occurred because of all three types of costs, delay costs, strategic bargaining 
costs, and failed agreements. 
  Comparing the buyer-offer, two-seller (with delay costs) treatment to the buyer-offer with 
competition treatment, sellers as a group earned slightly more in the former ($14.48) than the latter 
($13.44), and there were no failed agreements. The extent of holdout in the competition treatment was 
considerably less, however, with agreements occurring, on average, in period 1.85 with competition, and 
period 2.47 without. This difference in delay is statistically significant. The buyer earned about $2.50 
more, on average, when there was competition, so we can conclude that about 60% of this increase (about 
$1.50) was the avoidance of delay costs and 40% (about $1.00) was because offers could be strategically 
reduced. 
  The results are very similar across the seller-demand treatments. In the one-seller and two-seller 
treatments with no delay costs, there were an equal number of failed agreements (one) in each. As a 
group, sellers made $18.56 on average, while the average seller earnings in the one-seller treatment was 
                                                           
8 Using Mann-Whitney Test, two-tailed significance level = 0.330. 
9 The difference is statistically significant (two-tailed significance level = 0.08).  
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$15.31. The buyer earned $3.65 less on average when there were two sellers. Because there were no delay 
costs, the change in buyer’s average earnings was due almost solely to strategic bargaining costs arising 
because of the increase in the number of sellers. Interestingly, as in the buyer-offer treatments, it actually 
took slightly longer for agreements to be reached with one seller (period 7.27 on average) compared to 
with two sellers (period 6.50), though the difference is not highly significant.
10 
  Comparing the seller-demand (costly delay) treatment with two-sellers versus four sellers, sellers 
as group earned almost exactly the same amount between the two treatments ($15.60 with two sellers 
versus $15.84 with four). There were four failed agreements with four sellers and none with two sellers. 
The average agreement period was slightly higher (period 3.05) with four sellers compared to two (2.67). 
The buyer earned just over $4 less in the four-seller treatment. Thus, we can conclude that the decrease in 
buyer’s earnings were due primarily to delay costs and failed agreements. 
  Comparing the seller-demand treatments with and without competition, there were no failed 
agreements in either the two-seller, costly delay treatment or the competition treatment. However, 
agreements were reached more quickly when there was competition (by period 1.85, on average) 
compared to without competition (by period 2.67, on average). Sellers earned $5.56 less as a group when 
there was competition ($10.24 versus $15.80) while the buyer earned $7.34 more, on average, when there 
was competition. Thus, we can conclude that about 75% of the increase in the buyer’s earnings occurred 
from the reduction in strategic bargaining costs, and about 25% from reduced delay costs. 
  The introduction of delay costs alone significantly reduced holdout, but also resulted in lower 
overall efficiency of exchange. Comparing the two-seller, buyer-offer treatments with and without delay 
costs, the average agreement period fell significantly (from 6.40 to 2.47) when delay was costly. 
However, overall efficiency also fell from 100% to 85.3%. Similarly, in the two-seller, seller-demand 
treatments with and without delay costs, the average agreement period fell significantly (from 6.50 to 
2.67) when delay was costly. Efficiency fell from 96.7% to 83.3%. 
                                                           
10 Significance level = 0.15.  
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5.  An Alternative Behavioral Model 
   Why does an increase in the number of sellers reduce the buyer’s expected earnings regardless of 
whether offers originate from the buyer or the sellers? Some of the decrease arises from delay costs, but 
much of the decrease appears to come from strategic bargaining costs. The following model provides a 
possible explanation for this result. For simplicity, normalize the buyer’s value to V = 1 throughout the 
following analysis. Assume sellers’ each have a minimum acceptable offer (MAO) of  i x that is private 
information distributed independently and identically according to a publicly known continuous uniform 












i / 1 or 0 for 0
/ 1 0 for
) ( where N is the 
total number of sellers. Therefore, a non-negative economic surplus is always generated from the transfer 
of all sellers’ units to the buyer, regardless of the number of sellers. Furthermore, by assuming MAOs are 
distributed from 0 to an upper limit of 1/N the expected surplus is held constant as the number of sellers 
increases.
11 That is, multiple small sellers are no more demanding than a single large seller. Alternatively, 
the expected cost of multiple small sellers is no greater than the expected cost of a single large seller. 
Sellers are assumed to accept any offer that exceeds their MAO. It should be noted that all of the 
following analysis could be generalized to other distributions of MAOs. The uniform distribution and 
parameters used here are chosen for simplicity and tractability only. 
  The MAO’s may be interpreted as unknown sellers’ costs. Alternatively, in an environment with 
complete information about the buyer’s value and sellers’ costs (as in Cadigan et al (2009), MAOs may 
be interpreted as arising from heterogeneous preferences for fairness (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)) where the MAO is the offer level above which the responder would receive 
                                                           
11 The distribution of sellers’ MAOs from 0 to 1/N has intuitive appeal if MAOs are interpreted as arising from 
satisficing behavior or reservation prices arising from unknown sellers’ costs. However, if MAOs are interpreted as 
arising from heterogeneous preferences for fairness, then a distribution of MAOs from 0 to 1/(N+1) may be more 
appealing, as 1/(N+1) indicates a strictly egalitarian division of the surplus. The actual distribution of MAOs does 
not qualitatively change the insights of the model except that in the latter case, sellers as a group become more 
demanding as the number of sellers increases.  
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positive net utility, and below which responder utility from accepting would be negative. Finally, MAOs 
may arise as the result of satisficing behavior on the part of responders (Simon 1955, 1959). Of course, 
MAOs may arise as a combination of factors. The primary concern here is not the origin of MAOs, but 
rather their impact on the bargaining behavior of buyers and sellers as the number of sellers increases. 
Buyer offers to N sellers 
  Let the buyer be the proposer with sellers deciding to accept or reject the buyer’s offer according 
to the MAO rule. Given the known distribution of MAOs, the buyer makes symmetric offers b to the 
sellers that maximize the buyer’s expected payoff. Each seller accepts the offer if   i x b  . The probability 
that seller i accepts an offer of b is  Nb N b b x P i    ) / 1 /( ) ( . Because each of the N sellers must 
accept the offer for an exchange to be realized, the probability the buyer receives the associated payoff of 
) 1 ( Nb   is 
N Nb) ( . Therefore, the buyer solves 
  
N









b .           ( 4 )  








Nb .           ( 5 )  









 .          ( 6 )  
We summarize these results as Result 1. 
Result 1: As the number of sellers N increases, the buyer’s optimal offer to each seller decreases, the sum 
of the shares offered to sellers increases, the probability of a successful exchange decreases, and the 
buyer’s expected payoff decreases. 
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Result 1 demonstrates why the buyer would voluntarily make a higher joint offer to sellers as a group as 
the number of sellers increases, even if sellers are no more greedy (based on MAO’s) as a group. Because 
the agreement requires unanimous consent, the probability that a given joint offer is accepted by all 
decreases as the number of sellers increases. To maximize his expected payoff, the buyer must offset this 
with a relatively higher collective offer to sellers.  
  N sellers demands on a single buyer 
    Alternatively, consider the case where N sellers each make a single take-it-or-leave-it demand di 
on a buyer. Similar to the case above, assume the buyer has an MAO that is private information drawn 
from the publicly known uniform distribution    1 , 0 U ~ i x .
12 The buyer accepts the set of sellers’ 
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Notice that the sellers’ equilibrium individual and joint demands are identical to equilibrium offers made 
by the buyer above. The probability of a successful exchange (P*) is 
                                                           
12 Again, the buyer’s MAO may be interpreted as unknown project valuation, as in Eckart (1985) and Strange 
(1995). Alternatively, the buyer’s MAO may arise from heterogeneous preferences for fairness or satisficing 
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We summarize these results as Result 2. 
Result 2: As the number of sellers N increases, the individual seller’s equilibrium demand from the buyer 
decreases, the sellers’ joint demand on the buyer increases, and the probability of a successful exchange 
decreases. 
 
The intuition behind Result 2 is that sellers face a Cournot-like problem with respect to demands. In 
setting his demand, each seller ignores the externality imposed on other sellers as he raises his demand. 
This results in excessively high demands and a lower probability of acceptance relative to the case when 
sellers cooperate in their demand decisions. It is straightforward to show that individual optimal 







         ( 1 1 )  
and that  
  * i
cooperate
i d d          ( 1 2 )  
whenever there are multiple sellers. 
    The experimental results are strongly consistent with the predictions given in Results 1 and 2. 
That is, the buyer’s expected earnings are clearly inversely related to the number of sellers. There is also 
some evidence that the likelihood of a successful exchange is inversely related to the number of sellers, as 
the majority of failed exchanges occurred in the treatments with four sellers. However, due to the high 
agreement rate in general, there is not conclusive support for this result. 
    The simple alternative behavioral model based on minimum acceptable offers also does not 
capture the interesting strategic effects that a multi-period bargaining game allows. It does explain, 
however, why increasing the number of sellers reduces the buyer’s expected earnings. Both the first-
period offer and demand results and final earnings results from the experiment are strongly consistent 
with the model’s predictions.  
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6.  Conclusion 
As O’Flaherty (1994) notes in his theoretical analysis of land assembly, a variety of different 
bargaining institutions may be employed in the context of land assembly. Specifically, he states  
The developer can make offers one at a time or simultaneously to a group of lot owners; the lot 
owners can respond one at time or simultaneously; the lot owners can make offers one at a time 
or simultaneously; or the developer and lot owners can alternate offers in some fashion. The rules 
can specify the order in which lot owners are dealt with, or the order can be endogenous. The 
developer can have the ability to resell, or not. The players can have different discount rates. All 
these different games can and do have different equilibria; and a particular game may even have 
multiple equilibria. The distribution of rent, in particular, is very sensitive to the exact structure 
chosen…” (p. 292) 
 
While our study leaves many interesting empirical questions about the land assembly problem 
unanswered, it does provide some insight into why the number of sellers, ceteris paribus, is an important 
determinant of the buyer’s payoff and, therefore, the incentives to acquire and develop property. Our 
study also provides a better link between the theoretical analysis of land assembly games and the 
experimental analysis of behavior in bargaining games. We have explored several of the institutional 
details highlighted by O’Flaherty, and examined these in environments with varied group sizes and 
competition between sellers. 
Both the theoretical and experimental results indicate a consistent decrease in the buyer’s 
earnings as the number of sellers is increased, ceteris paribus, from one to two to four. Importantly, these 
results provide empirical support to the theoretical argument and conventional wisdom that buyers would 
prefer to bargain with a smaller number of sellers. Development projects in the field may involve 
anywhere from one to possibly hundreds of landowners, so the importance of the number of sellers for the 
distribution of the surplus and the efficiency of exchange cannot be overstated. 
Future research is necessary to identify whether our results are robust to further changes in the 
bargaining institution. In particular, alternating offer and Nash bargaining are two examples yet to be 
adequately explored in the context of multilateral land-assembly-type bargaining games. Furthermore, we 
should note that all treatments investigated here involved complete information, and that most bargaining  
  20
environments in the field are likely to be characterized by incomplete or asymmetric information about 
buyers’ values or sellers’ costs. There is little doubt that information plays a key role in these bargaining 
outcomes, and it is important that this role be investigated both theoretically and empirically. 
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7.  Tables 


































N = 33 











N = 29 
Buyer Two-seller 
(delay costs) 











N = 30 
Buyer Four-seller, 
(delay costs) 
$18.54    
(1.64) 
$15.85    
(6.31) 




$3.85   
(1.73) 
 
N = 29 
Buyer Competition 
(delay costs) 
$34.74    
(3.48) 
$20.53    
(6.55) 
$4.74    
(3.48) 
$13.65    
(6.09) 
$6.72    
(3.25) 
 
N = 31 











N = 27 


































$10.91    
(9.68) 
$5.30    
(4.16) 
$3.96    
(2.80) 
 





$40.74    
(6.19) 
$13.41
13    
(5.11) 
$8.29
14    
(3.52) 
$16.73    
(4.05) 
$5.12    
(2.57) 
 




                                                           
13 Assumes buyer accepts two lowest demands. 
14 Includes the earnings of the two sellers with the lowest demands. Excludes earnings of seller with the highest 
demand.  
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N = 33 
    
 
                                                           
15 Assumes the maximum number of acceptable offers is two per group. Therefore, this calculation is (max # of 
acceptances – actual # of acceptances)/max number of acceptances = (66 – 34)/66 = 48.5%. 
 